In economies with pub1ic goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare 01' any of them. Journal ol Economic Literature Classitication Numbers: 063; H41.
INTRODUCTION
The welfarist approach to Social Choice Theory proposes allocating re so urce s in such a way that all the information not contained in the utility possibility set is ignored. This approach is exemplified in Bargaining Theory which studies utility allocation mechanisms defined on an abstract setting in which all the relevant information about the agents is summarized in the utility possibility set and a threat point. Characterizing those mechanisms by a minimal set of fairness properties is at the core of the theory.
This line of research has been questioned by J. Roemer [13] [14] [15] . J. Roemer's critique to Axiomatic Bargaining Theory is based on the observation that much of the relevant economic information is 10st when the problem is presented as one of dividing up utility.
He pro vides sorne examples of genuinely different economic models giving rise to the same utility possibility set and the same threat point. Yet the intuition provided by sorne econornic environments may not be valid for others. Thus, it is hard to justify the usage of mechanisms which depend only on the information contained in the utility possibility set.ln addition, empirical resuIts [21] suggest that the notions offairness observed in people are based on more information than just that contained in the attainable utilities.
In [14], 1. Roemer characterizes five classical solutions ofAxiomatic Bargaining Theory. He argues that to reconstruct the standard axiomatic characterizations of Bargaining Theory, one has to consider commodity spaces of unbounded dimensiono And it is no longer clear that the economic analogues of the axioms of Bargaining Theory still characterize a solution in more realistic and smaller domains. Thus, he views his work as " ... demonstrating the lengths to which one must go to preserve the axiomatic characterization of the standard bargaining mechanisms on economic environments" [14, p. 32] . He concludes that classical Bargaining Theory is unacceptable as a positive model of the bargaining process as well as a norrnative model of resource allocation.
The present paper is an atternpt to reconcile sorne of the principIes contained in Bargaining Theory with the work of J. Roemer by showing that E. Kalai's characterization [4] of the egalitarian solution can be transplanted from classical Bargaining Theory into sorne economically meaningfuI environments.
We consider a set of agents endowed with preferences on vectors of public goods and a single private good (money), which can be represented by quasi-linear utility functions with constant marginal utility in the private good. There is a commonly owned technology to produce public goods bundles using the private good as an input. The agents differ in their valuations of the public goods and the issue is to design a production plan and a financing scheme for it.
We adopt the point of view of social choice theory in that we seek a solution determined by sorne equitable properties. We focus on the three key properties considered by Kalai in his characterization of the egalitarian solution, Pareto efficiency, symrnetry and monotonicity. The axiorn of Pareto optimality needs no modification in our context but, the other two have to be reinterpreted within the economic situation at hand.
The intuition behind the axiom of symmetry is that agents which cannot be distinguished with the information available in the model should be treated equally. In Bargaining theory this means that if the utility possibility set is symmetric, then all the agents should end up with the same utility level. However, here, as in J. Roemer's example, it will be the case that different economic situations with genuinely different agents correspond to the same utility possibility set. Thus, in the context of our modeling, it seems more appropriate to postulate the following axiom: whenever all the agents have the same preferences, they should aH pay the same amount of private good (of course, the level of the public goods enjoyed by the agents is, by definition, the same for aH of them).
The monotonicity axiom requires that enlarging the set of alternatives available to the agents should not hurt any of them. The well known intuition supporting this principIe is that if the pie gets larger, then everybody should benefit (perhaps differently) from it. In the quasi-linear world a bigger pie corresponds to having a larger surplus to share. However, all the agents contribute to the surplus. And it is possible that it becomes larger, because of the greater contributions of sorne of the agents, even though sorne others reduce their participation in the common project. Is it fair then to demand axiomatically that aH of them benefit? To make monotonicity more palatable we consider the following modification. If sorne agent raises his valuation of the public goods but the rest do not modify their valuations (so total surplus is now higher and nobody contri bu tes less than before to it), then the payoff of every agent should not decrease.
This idea is not entirely new in the literature. It has been used before in [16] [17] [18] in a slightly different form. The reasoning therein is that whenever there is a change in the preferences of sorne agents, the ones whose preferences remain the same should be affected in the same direction. This property is usually referred to as "solidarity" and that is the name we have adopted here as well. This concept is also related with the notions of population solidarity [20] and skill so Iidarity [3] .
The main result of our work is to show that on the set of economies with qua si-linear preferences, the three axioms we have just discussed determine the same rule as in c1assical Bargaining Theory. That is, the welfare egalitarian correspondence which splits the surplus equally among the agents. We restrict ourselves to standard economic domains with, for example, a fixed commodity space and make use of a reduced number of axioms. Thus, our findings provide (as in [13] [14] [15] ) an alternative foundation of welfarism based on economic principies.
There is a rather extensive literature studying the egalitarian solution in addition to Kalai's characterization. R. B. Myerson [11] uses a condition on decomposability with respect to sequences of bargaining problems and enough invariance under ordinal utility transformations. W. Thomson [20] pro vides another characterization in terms of population monotonicity and other axioms. Moulin [8] considers social choice functions which share equally the surplus aboye a reference utility level. In a related work, H. Moulin and J. Roemer [9J propose three properties, in addition to efficiency, which reflect the public and private property rights of the agents.
y. Sprumont [17J has axiornatized the welfare egalitarian solution by means of solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and preferences. Whenever a change occurs in the feasibility correspondence andjor sorne of the agent's preferences, all the agents whose preferences have not changed are sirnilarly affected. In contrast, the axiom of solidarity, as presented he re, applies only to a restricted dass of changes in the preferences of the agents. In addition, we define welfare egalitarianisrn in terrns of the preferences of the agents themselves and not with respect to sorne abstract preordering on the space of preferences and indifference dasses of allocations as in [17 J . In other words, we insist that the modeling and axioms stem directly from the fundamentals of the economic scenario.
One rnay condude that Bargaining Theory is a rather ambitious project with a scope which is unrealistically universal. After all, its proposals apply, in principIe, to every conceivable conflict. Yet, sorne of its ideas and intuitions are recoverable if we are willing to work at a srnaller scale and incorporate the relevant econornic considerations into the model. Of course, the price one has to pay is a loss in the universality of the fairness properties, which might now depend on the econornic context of interest.
THE MODEL
We consider an economy with one private good and several public goods. The consurnption set of the private good is ~ and the space of public goods 2 is Y = ~: = {y E ~m : y;?: O}. These are produced by means of a technology jointly owned by the agents. The production possibilities are described by a function e: Y --> ~ + measuring the cost of producing each bundle of public goods in terrns of the single private good of the econorny. Throughout this paper we will consider a fixed cost function e satisfying the following. means that Xi;' Zi (resp. Xi> Zi) for every i = 1, ... , p. We write x> z to indicate that x;' z and x # z. Finally, x::r z means that Xi ~ Zi for sorne i = 1, ... , p. 3 A mapping e: Y --> [R; is lower semicontinuous iffor ea eh Z E Y we havef(::.) ~ Iim infy~z f( y). A lowcr semicontinuous function is bounded below on every compact set and attains its minimum value. Assumption 2.1 allows for technologies with jumps, so initial fixed costs are not ruled out in the model. The limit condition precludes increasing returns to scale in the economy for very large bundles of public goods, but does not restrict the technology on a bounded set of goods.
We let N = {1, 2 ... , n} denote the set of agents with consumption set
Here, W¡ is the initial endowment of private good of agent i E N. The preference relation of agent i = 1, ... , n is represented by a quasi-linear utility function
and ni: Y --> lR. Hence, u¡(y; t) is the utility obtained by agent i E N when the bundle y E Y of public goods is implemented and he has to contribute the amount t¡ towards, its financing. For convenience, we write u¡(y; t) as depending on t = (t ¡, ... , t n) E X even though agent i E N is interested only in the consumption of the public goods and his private good so, for n¡, ... , nn and W¡, ... , W n fixed, u;(y; t) depends only on y E Y and ti E Xi' The following assumption is made on the preferences of the agents. ¡m sup --< oo.
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There are several interpretations for the mappings n ¡, ... , n n and we do not adhere necessarily to any of them. On the one hand, the amount n¡(y) represents the valuation that agent i E N has of the public goods y. One can also think of it as representing his private technology to exploit those public goods or the benefit (in terms of the private good) he would obtain if he could enjoy those public goods for free. If the status quo is no consumption of any of the public goods, then n ¡( y) is also the maximum amount of his private good that he is willing to pay for the consumption of the bundle y.
On the other hand, n¡(y) + W i -t¡ is the net benefit agent i E N obtains when he has to contribute t ¡ units of his private good in order to enjoy the bundle y of public goods. Thus, n¡(y) + W¡ -t¡ is also the net contribution that agent i E N makes towards the total surplus, L:
that the society obtains from the consumption of the bundle y E Y of public goods.
We 
.. = n n( y) -t n is the set of all welfare egalitarian allocations.
Note that the welfare egalitarian allocations equate the surplus obtained from the public goods ignoring the initial differences in endowments. Thus, we are considering w to be the disagreement point or status qua: if the public project is not developed, every agent keeps his initial endowment of the private good and this is the minimum welfare level guaranteed by the welfare egalitarian correspondence. The solution pro po sed aboye suggests to equate the welfare gains of the agents aboye the disagreement point.
An alternative definition might be to require that ni (y) + w ¡ -ti = ... = nn(y) + W n -tn-We will discuss other differences between these two possibilities at the end of Section 3.
The welfare egalitarian correspondence is essentially unique since the agents are indifferent among the various allocations in it. However, as the next example shows, it might be empty. On the other hand, ifw¡ +W2): 1, then the set P= {(y; ti, t 2 ): t¡ +t 2 = 1, t;:(w;, i= 1, 2} is al so a subset ofthe Pareto optimal allocations. Thus, The above example illustrates two issues which arise from the introduction of initial endowments. The first one is rather technical: the Pareto optimal allocations do not necessarily correspond to difIerent distributions of the cost of the bundle(s) optimizing the surplus L7~ 1 n¡(y) -c(y) of the economy. This statement holds only for Pareto optimal allocations (y; t) for which t» W (see [1] ).
More substantially for our purposes, t shows that whenever the total By Assumption 2.5 there are enough private resources to carry out the optimal plan of public goods and to make payment transfers of the private good among the agents. Example 2.4 shows that the welfare egalitarian correspondence might be empty unless something like Assumption 2.5 holds. Nevertheless, we can dispose of Assumption 2.5 provided we are willing to allow negative consumption of the private good. 6 We will not do so, since in the present framework of interpersonal comparison of utilities, it seems reasonable to take into account the efIects that the initial distribution of endowments might have on the welfare attained by the agents.
For a fixed technology c, for which Assumption 2.1 holds, an economy is defined to be a pair (n, w) consisting of a vector of u tili ty profiles n = (n 1 , ••• , nn) verifying Assumption 2.2 and a vector of initial endowments W = (w 1 , ... , w n ) satisfying Assumption 2.5. We let E denote the set of such economies. A mechanism is a function R: E ....... Y x X which assigns to every economy (n, w) E E a feasible allocation R(n, w) = (y(n, w); t(n, w)). We denote by P( n, w) (resp. W( n, w)) the set of Pareto optimal (resp. welfare egalitarian) allocations. is Pareto optimal (see [1] ) it is also welfare egalitarian. I
The problem faced by the agents is to find "the optimal" bundle of public goods and a fair share of its cost. According to the normative approach an "acceptable" mechanism should satisfy certain equitable requirements. The principIes which we propose here are described by the foHowing three properties. Axioms 
For every (n, w)EE, (i) R(n,w)EP(n,w).
(ii) If n¡= ... =nn and W¡= ... =W n then, u¡(R(n,w))= ... =
un(R(n, w)).

(iii) If n): v and w): (J, then u(n,w)(R(n, w)) -w): u(v'O')(R(v, (J)) -(J.
Properties (i) and (ii) reflect, respectively, the notions of Pareto efficiency and symmetry. They are standard in the literature, so we will make no further comment about them. The novelty here lies on Axiom 2.7 (iii). This is akin to the requirement of No Disposal of Utilities as stated in [8] .
An equivalent statement is that if n io ): Vio and w io ): (Jio' for some io E N, then u(n, w)( R(n, w)) -w): u(v, 0')( R( v, (J))
-(J for the vectors of utilities and endowments n = (n_ io ' Vio) and w = (w-io ' (Jio)' Thus, it reduces to comparisons involving only changes of preferences and endowments in one agent.
We note that Property 2.7(iii) focuses on increases in gains u(R(n, w)) -w, with respect to the status quo w, as n and w vary. We might also consider the possibility of studying changes in the total welfare u ( R( n, w) ) of the agents with respect to variations in n and w. This is addressed at the end of the next section.
One possible interpretation of this axiom is that if, after reaching an agreement, one of the agents finds out that he can increase the benefit he obtains from the public goods, then he is entitled to a larger share of the surplus (since he contributes a greater amount to it) as long as this does not affect negatively the others. It is in this sense that Axiom 2.7 is called a solidarity axiom: An increase in the skill of one agent benefits the whole society, or at least does not hurt the other members. In particular, if one interprets the mappings n ¡, ... , nn as the private technology used by the agents to exploit the public goods then, no agent will oppose technological advancement by others.
Thus, the axiom of solidarity is akin to the monotonicity property of Axiomatic Bargaining Theory. One may justify it on the basis that, since the technology to produce the public goods is jointIy owned by all the agents, they are forced to cooperate in agreeing both on a single bundle of public goods and a financing plan for it. At the end of the next section we will come back to a further discussion 01' this issue.
Remark 2.8. To simplify the treatment, given a quasi-linear preference relation -< ¡, we are fixing the unique utility function representation n¡{y)+w¡-t¡ such that n;(O) =0 and we work with this representation. Nevertheless, we point out that our solution concept Wand properties 2.7 can be given an ordinal meaning which is independent of the chosen representation.
For example, it is easy to show that property 2.7(iii) is an ordinal axiom. To see this, consider for each agent i E N, a (quasi-linear) preference 
Likewise, a feasible allocation (ji; i) is welfare egalitarian if and only if it is Pareto optimal and T -<
As we have already noticed, even though W( n, w) might contain several allocations, the agents are indifferent among them. Clearly any selection from W satisfies Axioms 2.7. The content of the next result is that this is essentially the only way to obtain a mechanism satisfying those properties.
THEOREM 2.9. A mechanism R satisfies Axioms 2.7 if and only ir R(n,w)E W(n,w)for every (n,w)EE.
The result aboye admits also a negative interpretation. One may ask whether it is possible that increasing the skill that sorne agents have to profit from the public goods benefits only (or perhaps mostly) those agents responsible for the larger surplus, without hurting the others. Theorem 2.9 shows that this is incompatible with Pareto efficiency and symmetry.
We address now the proof of Theorem 2.9. We will show that every mechanism satisfying Axiom 2.7 has to be a selection of the welfare egalitarian correspondence.
Proof of Theorem 2.9. Let R be a mechanism satisfying Axiom 2.7 and
The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. Choose another economy with the same endowment w and a profile of utilities v( y) such that v ~ 7r and v;( z) = n ¡( ji) is constant for every z ~ ji. Then, u"(j;r) = u v(j;f) and by Axiom 2. ,w) ) and we may assume that R( v, w) = (j; f) as wel1.
Step 2. Choose y* large enough such that y*» ji and c(y*) > n max { v, (ji), ... , V n (ji)} . Let 8> O be a real number su eh that (1 -8) y* » ji and ehoose a utility pro file (( y) sueh that the following eonditions hold.
(iii) ((z)=((y*) for every z~y*.
(iv) For eaeh ¡EN, the solution to max{(¡(z)-c(z): ZE Y} 1S attained at the point y*.
We indieate next (see Fig. 1 ) how it is possible to eonstruet the functions (" ... , (/1" First, note that to obtain (iv) one only needs to make the functions (, = ... = (11 "steep" enough Step 3. Take the vector ofutilities f3¡(z) =max{ v¡(z), ¿¡(z)}, i= 1, ... , n and the same endowments a as in step 2. We also choose e> O in there smaH enough so that, for each i = 1, ... , n, the solution to the problem max s.1. 
PRIVA TE GOODS
We argued in Section 2 that Axiom 2.3(iii) can be justified in a cooperative setting and it is interpreted as sorne type of solidarity among the agents. In this section we elaborate further on this issue and present a different economic context in which the characterization result of the previous section does not translate. As we will see, in an economic environment in which agents do not have any incentives to coordinate their decisions, the solidarity Axiom 2.3(iii) does no longer determine a unique solution. Thus, imposing this requirement has bite only whenever sorne degree of cooperation among the agents is necessary.
Formally (though not conceptually), the model we consider now is a slight modification of the one studied in the previous section. We abandon now the setting of public goods and let Y¡ = IR: be the space of (produced) private goods consumed by agent i E N. That is, we assume that the sets Xl, ... , X n , represent, as in Section 2, the spaces of sorne private good which can be used, by means of a public technology e, to produce a bundle of goods y E ¿7~ 1 Y¡. The key difference with the previous section is that the new vector y is no longer a bundle of public goods, but it has to be divided The difference between public versus private goods is that in the first case agents are forced to come up with sorne cornrnon identical bundle, consumed by all of thern. On the other hand, with private goods, the linear technology allows each of them to behave individualistically; in such a way that the different solutions proposed by each of the agents are compatible. This example shows that one has to be careful when postulating the principIes of Bargaining Theory within economic environments. As pointed out by the work of Roemer [14] , sorne of those axioms might be reasonable in sorne settings but completely unjustified for others. In particular, the characterization results might hold only for sorne, very concrete family of rnodels but not for all them. In this sen se, the price paid for getting around J. E. Roemer's critique and making the principies ofAxiomatic Bargaining Theory applicable to economic scenarios is a loss in its universal character.
To finish we remar k that our formulation for Axiom 2.7(iii) distributes the surplus aboye the initial endowments L7~ 1 n¡(ji) -c(ji) equally among the agents and each agent j E N enjoys a utility equivalent to the consumption of no public good and the amount w j + ~ (L7~ 1 n¡( ji) -c(ji) ) of the priva te goods. However the total surplus of the agents is in fact S = L7~ 1 (n¡{ji) + w¡} -c(ji). Another seemingly reasonable alternative might be to distribute total surplus S, including the initial endowment of private goods, among the agents so that all of them would end up with the same equivalent consumption of the private good. Let us call this solution W* so, (y*; t) E W*(n, w) if it is Pareto optimal and u¡(y*; t) = S/n for all agents i E N.
It is easy to see that W* does not satisfy Property 2.7(iii). Nevertheless, it does comply with another very similar property which, at first sight, might be more natural than Property 2.7(iii). Namely, if n ~ v and
w~CJ, then u(n.w)(R(n, w)) ~ u(v.a)(R(v, CJ)).
Note that the original welfare egalitarian correspondence W defined in Definition 2.3 also satisfies this alternative property. Hence, with this new axiom substituting Axiom 2.7(iii), there is no longer a unique solution. So, if we were to use the aboye property instead ofAxiom 2.7(iii), we would need a fourth axiom to specify a solution. (One could, for example, specify what happens when there are no public goods.)
Let us argue that our proposal W is more appropriate for the present set up than the other seemingly reasonable alternative W*. We have just seen that, in the absence of public goods, equal distribution does not seem to have the same support in terms of the fairness principies that we have discussed here.
So, consider the extreme case in which public goods do not matter at all for the welfare of the society. That is, suppose that n¡ = O for all i E N. For this particular example, our solution W proposes the status quo allocation (O; O); i.e., no public good is implemented an each agent retains his initial endowment of private goods. On the other hand, W* would also dictate not to produce any public goods but it would still recommend to distribute the initial endowments equally among the agents. With no real incentives to cooperate, it does not seem so reasonable to expect that sorne agents would fee! compelled to give away part of the their private endowment. A similar argument shows also that, under the mechanism W*, there will be situations in which sorne agents would be better off by keeping their initial endowment and not participating in the common project. Thus, W* fails also to provide sorne minimum individual rationality incentives.
